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Abstract
This paper considers a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian wiretap channel model, where there
exists a transmitter, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper, each equipped with multiple antennas. Perfect
secrecy is achieved when the transmitter and the legitimate receiver can communicate at some positive rate, while
ensuring that the eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. In this paper, the perfect secrecy capacity of the
multiple antenna MIMO wiretap channel is found for aribtrary numbers of antennas under the assumption that the
transmitter performs beamforming based on the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD). More precisely,
the optimal allocation of power for the GSVD-based precoder that achieves the secrecy capacity is derived. This
solution is shown to have several advantages over prior work that considered secrecy capacity for the general
MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under a high SNR assumption. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the
proposed theoretical findings.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of a wireless medium makes it very susceptible to eavesdropping, where the
transmitted message is decoded by unintended receiver(s). Recent information-theoretic research on se-
cure communication has focused on enhancing security at the physical layer. The wiretap channel, first
introduced and studied by Wyner [1], is the most basic physical layer model that captures the problem
of communication security. Wyner showed that when an eavesdropper’s channel is a degraded version of
the main channel, the source and destination can achieve a positive secrecy rate, while ensuring that the
eavesdropper gets zero bits of information. The maximum secrecy rate from the source to the destination
is defined as the secrecy capacity. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the outputs at the legitimate
receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), was studied in
[2].
Determining the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel is in general a difficult non-convex
optimization problem, and has been addressed independently in [3-7]. Oggier and Hassibi [3] and Khisti
and Wornell [4, 5] followed an indirect approach using a Sato-like argument and matrix analysis tools.
They considered the problem of finding the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel
subject to a constraint on the total average power, and a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity
in the high signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) regime was obtained in [5]. However, the optimal input covariance
matrix that achieves the secrecy capacity at high SNR is not fully characterized, especially for the case
where there is non-trivial nullspace for the channel between the transmitter and eavesdropper. When there
is such a nullspace, [5] uses a complicated beamforming matrix to transmit two groups of information-
bearing symbols into two different subspaces, one that lies in the nullspace of the channel matrix at the
unintended receiver, and the other orthogonal to it. As indicated in [5], most of the transmission power is
allocated to the first subspace, and only a small fraction of the power is allocated to the other. Furthermore,
the available power is distributed uniformly over the dimensions of the two subspaces. In addition to the
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2complexity of the beamforming matrix, the other drawback of [5] is that the precise allocation of power
between the two subspaces is not clear, nor is the sensitivity of the secrecy capacity to this power fraction
quantified.
In [6], Liu and Shamai propose a more information-theoretic approach using the enhancement concept,
originally presented by Weingarten et al. [8], as a tool for the characterization of the MIMO Gaussian
broadcast channel capacity. Liu and Shamai have shown that an enhanced degraded version of the channel
attains the same secrecy capacity as does a Gaussian input distribution. From the mathematical solution
in [6] it was evident that such an enhanced channel exists; however it was not clear how to construct such
a channel until the work of [7], which provided a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity under
a covariance matrix power constraint. While this result is interesting since the expression for the secrecy
capacity is valid for all SNR scenarios, there still exists no computable secrecy capacity expression for
the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel under an average total power constraint. To date, a solution has only
been obtained for the so-called MISOME case in [4], where the transmitter and eavesdropper may have
multiple antennas, but the desired receiver has only one.
In this paper, we investigate the non-convex optimization of the secrecy rate for the general Gaussian
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel under a constraint on the total average power,
where the number of antennas is arbitrary for both the transmitter and the two receivers. We focus on the
case where the transmitter uses beamforming (linear precoding) based on the generalized singular value
decomposition (GSVD), as in [5]. In particular, we obtain the optimal power allocation that achieves
the secrecy capacity for the GSVD scheme. The resulting power allocation is significantly different in
nature than the standard water-filling solution for achieving capacity in MIMO links without secrecy
considerations. Compared with [5], our beamforming matrix is much simpler to compute, and more
importantly, the input covariance matrix that achieves the secrecy capacity is completely characterized
in terms of the beamforming and power allocation matrices. We note that the analysis in this paper
characterizes the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with GSVD-based beamforming
for any SNR conditions, while [5] gives the secrecy capacity of a general Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel
(no restriction to GSVD beamforming), but only for the high SNR case.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the assumed mathematical
model. We then present the GSVD method and derive the optimal power allocation that achieves the secrecy
capacity in Section III. Finally, we demonstrate our results by means of several numerical examples in
Section IV.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a multiple-antenna wiretap channel with nt transmit antennas and nr and ne receive antennas
at the legitimate recipient and the eavesdropper, respectively:
yr = Hrx + zr (1)
ye = Hex+ ze (2)
where x is a zero-mean nt × 1 transmitted signal vector, zr ∈ Cnr×1 and ze ∈ Cne×1 are the additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) vectors at the receiver and eavesdropper, respectively, with i.i.d. entries
distributed as CN (0, 1). The matrices Hr ∈ Cnr×nt and He ∈ Cne×nt represent the channels associated
with the receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and are assumed to be quasi-static flat Rayleigh
fading and independent of each other, with i.i.d. entries distributed as CN (0, σ2r) and CN (0, σ2e). Similar
to other papers considering the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel, we assume that the transmitter
and both receivers are aware of the channel state information (CSI) for both links.
In a wiretap channel, the transmitter intends to send a confidential message W to the intended receiver
while keeping it as secret as possible from the eavesdropper. The corresponding information-theoretic
secrecy constraint is given by [1, 9]:
lim
N→∞
1
N
I(W ; Y Ne ) = 0 (3)
3where N is the number of channel uses for sending the message W , and I(W ; Y Ne ) represents the mutual
information between W and Y Ne . Consequently, the secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum number of
bits that can be correctly transmitted to the intended receiver while keeping the eavesdropper uninformed.
Using the single-letter characterization of the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel provided by Csiszar
and Korner in [9], the secrecy capacity is the solution of the following maximization problem:
Csec = max
U,X
[I(U ; Yr)− I(U ; Ye)] (4)
where X , Yr and Ye are random variable counterparts to the specific realizations x, yr and ye, respectively.
U is an auxiliary variable, and the maximization is over all jointly distributed (U,X) such that U → X →
(Yr, Ye) forms a Markov chain, while the channel input x satisfies an average total power constraint
Tr(E{xxH}) ≤ p (5)
where (.)H denotes the Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose, E is the expectation operator, and Tr(.) is
the matrix trace.
The auxiliary variable U represents a precoding signal. In [6], Liu and Shamai studied the optimization
problem of (4) and showed that a Gaussian U = X is an optimal choice. In other words, Gaussian random
binning without prefix coding is an optimal coding strategy for the MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel [10].
Hence, a matrix characterization of the secrecy capacity is given by
Csec = max
Qx0
[I(X ; Yr)− I(X ; Ye)] (6)
where Qx = E{xxH} is the input covariance matrix. The non-convex maximization problem in (6) is
considered under the power constraint (5).
III. OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION FOR THE GSVD-BASED GAUSSIAN MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
We consider the non-convex maximization problem in (6) for the case that the transmitter performs
beamforming by applying the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) to the channel matrices
Hr and He. Application of the GSVD technique was first used by Khisti and Wornell (see e.g. [5]) who
obtained a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity in the high SNR regime. In this section, we
first describe the GSVD beamforming method and next we derive the optimal power allocation matrix that
achieves the secrecy capacity for any SNR, and we describe some important advantages of this scheme
over what is proposed in [5].
Definition 1 (GSVD Transform): Given two matrices Hr ∈ Cnr×nt and He ∈ Cne×nt , gsvd(Hr, He) returns
unitary matrices Ψr ∈ Cnr×nr and Ψe ∈ Cne×ne , non-negative diagonal matrices C and D, and a matrix
A ∈ Cnt×q with q=min(nt, ne + nr), such that
HrA = ΨrC (7)
HeA = ΨeD (8)
The nonzero elements of C are in ascending order while the nonzero elements of D are in descending
order. Moreover, CTC+DTD = I.
The transmitted signal vector x is constructed as
x = AXS, XS ∼ CN (0,P) (9)
where A is obtained from gsvd(Hr, He) as above, and each element of the vector XS represents an
independently encoded Gaussian codebook symbol that is beamformed with the corresponding column
of the A matrix. P is a positive semi-definite diagonal matrix representing the power allocated by the
transmitter to the data symbols. In the following, we derive an optimal source power allocation which
4achieves the secrecy capacity of the GSVD-based MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel. Substituting (9) into
the channel model (1)-(2) and using (7)-(8) yields
yr = ΨrCXS + zr (10)
ye = ΨeDXS + ze (11)
Considering the above equations, the maximization problem in (6) is represented by
Csec = max
Qx
[I(X ; Yr)− I(X ; Ye)] =
max
P0,diagonal
log |I +ΨrCPCTΨHr | − log |I +ΨeDPDTΨHe |
subject to Tr(AHAP) ≤ p (12)
Theorem 1: Assuming that the transmitter applies the proposed beamforming matrix A, the optimal
source power allocation P∗ that achieves the secrecy capacity in problem (12) is given by
p∗i =
{
max(0,
−1+
√
1−4cidi+4(ci−di)cidi/(µai)
2cidi
), if ci > di
0, otherwise
(13)
where p∗i , ci, di and ai are the ith diagonal elements of the matrices P∗, CTC, DTD and diag(AHA),
respectively. The Lagrange parameter µ > 0 is chosen to satisfy the power constraint (5).
Proof: The optimization problem is non-convex. Our proof technique involves applying the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions (as necessary conditions), which help express the Lagrangian in the form of an
integral. This specific structure of the problem is then exploited to obtain a closed-form solution for the
optimal power allocation strategy. Details can be found in the Appendix.
Eqs. (7) and (8) show that applying the GSVD transform to Hr and He simultaneously diagonalizes
them. Thus, the GSVD transform creates a set of parallel independent subchannels between the sender
and the receivers, and it suffices to use independent Gaussian codebooks across these subchannels. More
precisely, as (13) indicates, it is optimal to use only those subchannels for which the output at the
eavesdropper is a degraded version of the output at the destination node. These subchannels correspond
to the condition ci > di, or as shown in [5], generalized singular values of gsvd(Hr, He) which are
larger than 1. Clearly, if there are no such subchannels, the achievable secrecy rate using this transmission
scheme would be zero [11].
It is interesting to note that the optimal source power allocation (13) is different from the water-filling
allocation that achieves capacity for fading channels without the secrecy constraint. Moreover, as we will
observe in Section IV, (13) has an important role in achieving the secrecy capacity even for moderately
high SNRs. We have the following result.
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity of the GSVD-based Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is
Csec = log |I +P∗CTC| − log |I +P∗DTD| (14)
Proof: Follows directly from substituting (13) in to (12) and by considering the fact that Ψr and Ψe are
unitary matrices.
It was shown in [5] that GSVD beamforming with uniform power allocation is sufficient to attain the
secrecy capacity of a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel in the high SNR regime. However, for the case
where there is a non-trivial nullspace in the channel between the transmitter and eavesdropper, the optimal
input covariance matrix that achieves the secrecy capacity is not fully characterized in [5]. When there
is such a nullspace, [5] uses a complicated beamforming matrix to transmit two groups of information
bearing symbols into two different subspaces. The associated beamforming matrices are obtained by
5performing an LQ decomposition on A as well as additional calculations which lead to Eq. (59) in [5].
The aforementioned subspaces are identified as follows [5, Eq. (58)]:
S1 = Null(He) ∩ Null(Hr)⊥
S2 = Null(He)⊥ ∩ Null(Hr)⊥ (15)
where Null(.) denotes the nullspace of its matrix argument, while ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement.
It is important to note that our transmission scheme in (9) and consequently our solution in Theorem 1
does not require such calculations, and in fact yields the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel with GSVD-based beamforming for any SNR under any assumptions regarding the nullspace of
the transmitter-to-eavesdropper channel.
As indicated in [5], most of the transmission power is assumed to be allocated to the subspace S1 and
only a small fraction for S2, and the available power is distributed uniformly over the dimensions of each
of these two subspaces. The exact allocation of power between these two subspaces is not specified in
[5], nor is the sensitivity of the secrecy capacity to the power allocation studied. In the next section, we
show that the secrecy capacity of a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel is in fact quite sensitive to how
power is allocated between these two subspaces, which illustrates that using the proposed optimal power
allocation is essential.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate our theoretical findings. In all of the following
figures, the channel matrices and background noise are modeled in the same way that we described in
Section II. In each figure, the values of nt, nr and ne, as well as σ2r , σ2e and p, will be depicted. In the
simulations we compare the secrecy capacity obtained by the optimal power allocation with the secrecy
rate achieved by uniform power allocation for a MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel with GSVD-based
beamforming. This comparison is performed for various transmit powers (SNR), channel conditions and
also different numbers of antennas for the transmitter and receivers. All displayed results are calculated
based on an average of at least 100 independent channel realizations. In each trial, the secrecy capacity is
obtained by evaluating (14), while the secrecy rate achieved by the uniform power allocation is obtained
by using analytical results presented in [5].
First we consider the case where the nullspace of the eavesdropper’s channel is non-trivial. Figs. 1
and 2 investigate the allocation of power between subspaces S1 and S2 as defined in (15), for a case
where nt = nr = 5, ne = 4 and the transmit power is p = 100, or SNR=20 dB. The solid horizontal line
illustrates the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel with GSVD-based beamforming and
optimal power allocation, while the dashed curve represents the secrecy rate achieved by uniform power
allocation versus the fraction of power used in subspace S2. Note that, for this high SNR scenario, the
peak of this curve is the secrecy capacity of the general MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel [5]. Note also
that, contrary to claims made in [5], the secrecy rate is quite sensitive to the fraction of power allocated to
the two subspaces, and optimal performance requires a non-trivial allocation of power to S2 (over 20%).
The advantage of the optimal GSVD-based power allocation approach is that this imprecise distribution
of power to the two subspaces is eliminated.
Fig. 3 compares the secrecy capacity achieved by the optimal power allocation and the secrecy rate
achieved by the uniform power allocation for different transmit powers (SNRs). In this example, there is
no non-trivial null space between the transmitter and eavesdropper. The figure shows that the difference
between the optimal and uniform power allocation is important, even at moderately high SNRs. This is
especially true for the case where the desired receiver’s channel is of equal or better quality than the
eavesdropper’s channel (σ2r ≥ σ2e ). As the figure shows, the performance difference between the optimal
and uniform power allocation curves slowly decreases as the SNR is increased. This is due to this fact
that, as derived in [5] for the high SNR regime, uniform power allocation is sufficient to achieve the
secrecy capacity.
6V. CONCLUSIONS
We have established the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel assuming the
transmitter uses GSVD-based beamforming. This non-convex optimization problem is solved subject to
an average transmit power constraint. In particular, we have derived the optimal power allocation for the
GSVD-based beamformers that achieves the secrecy capacity. Our numerical results demonstrate that the
optimal power allocation is necessary even for relatively high SNRs.
APPENDIX
We are interested in obtaining the power distribution that achieves the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
MIMO wiretap channel in problem (12) for the GSVD-based beamforming scheme presented in Section
III. This non-convex optimization problem is to be solved with the average power constraint
Tr(E{xxH}) = Tr(AE{XSXHS }AH)
= Tr(APAH) = Tr(AHAP) ≤ p (16)
By considering the fact that Ψr and Ψe are unitary matrices and det(I + EF) = det(I + FE), the
Lagrangian function L associated with this problem is given by
L = log |I +PCTC| − log |I +PDTD| − µTr(AHAP) (17)
where µ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier. Since P, CTC and DTD are diagonal matrices, L can be written
as
L =
∑
i
[log(1 + pici)− log(1 + pidi)]− µ
∑
i
aipi (18)
where pi, ci, di and ai are the ith diagonal elements of the matrices P, CTC, DTD and diag(AHA),
respectively. Clearly, pi, ci, di and ai all are real non-negative numbers. Using a technique similar to that
proposed in [12], the optimal p∗i must maximize
Li = log(1 + pici)− log(1 + pidi)− µaipi =
∫ pi
0
fi(x)dx (19)
where fi(x) is defined as
fi(x) =
1
ln 2
(
ci
1 + xci
− di
1 + xdi
)
− µai (20)
To obtain the optimal p∗i that maximizes Li in (19), we consider two cases based on the relationship
between ci and di.
1) ci ≤ di: In this case, (20) is always non-positive, i.e., fi(x) ≤ 0. Hence, the maximum of Li is
achieved by p∗i = 0.
2) ci > di: In this case, since fi(x) is a decreasing function for x ≥ 0, the optimal p∗i that maximizes Li
depends on the value of the largest root of fi(x) = 0. Let xLi denote the largest root of fi(x) = 0,
i.e.,
xLi =
−1 +√1− 4cidi + 4(ci − di)cidi/(µai)
2cidi
where we have used the fact that CTC +DTD = I, or equivalently ci + di = 1.1 If xLi is positive
then the maximum of Li is achieved by p∗i = xLi, otherwise p∗i = 0.
1It is easy to verify that µ > 0 guarantees 1− 4cidi + 4(ci − di)cidi/(µai) ≥ 0 for the case ci > di. To do so, it is sufficient to prove
that 1− 4cidi ≥ 0. We have:
ci + di = 1→ 1− 4cidi = 1− 4(1− di)di = 1− 4di + 4d
2
i = (1− 2di)
2 ≥ 0
7Combining cases 1 and 2, we obtain the desired result as
p∗i =
{
max(0,
−1+
√
1−4cidi+4(ci−di)cidi/(µai)
2cidi
), if ci > di
0, otherwise
(21)
Finally, the Lagrange parameter µ > 0 is chosen to satisfy the power constraint (16).
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Fig. 1. Comparison of secrecy capacity for optimal power allocation with secrecy rate for uniform power allocation at high SNR in a low
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